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aBstract
This articles concerns the compatibility of or-
thonomy (making the right choices) and au-
tonomy (making one’s own choices). on the one 
hand we have the experience that we do not just 
want to govern ourselves, but that we want to do 
so rightly. on the other hand, it seems that the 
very fact that our choices are responsive to rea-
sons is insufficient to explain why making these 
choices adds up to leading a life of one’s own. it 
is argued that we can develop a viable view on 
the co-realisation of autonomy and orthonomy 
by using the concept of a concern which is close-
ly linked to the concept op caring.
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at the background of this paper is a worry about the possibility of 
co-realisation of two important values: 
orthonomy and autonomy. This worry 
arises from two sides. on the one hand 
we have the experience that we do not 
just want to govern ourselves, but that we 
want to do so rightly. at least, we seek to 
distinguish better and worse ways of liv-
ing our lives. arbitrarily choosing how 
to live lacks the kind of grounding and 
depth of meaning that is precisely the 
point of engaging ourselves in practices 
of reflection and deliberation about what 
is right and good. We want our choices to 
be responsive to reasons. This is the nor-
mativity problem.
on the other hand, it seems that the 
very fact that our choices are responsive 
to reasons is insufficient to explain why 
making these choices adds up to leading 
a life of one’s own. The standards of cor-
rectness need to be individualized or in 
some sense made into my own standards 
in order to make the life i lead recogni-
sable as my life. This is the identity prob-
lem. There is, therefore, a worry about 
the way autonomy (making one’s own 
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choices) and orthonomy (making the right choices) could both be realised. how can 
we get a sense of making the right choices, if autonomy implies that in some way we 
ourselves set the standards of correctness (or at least have a say in the kind of person it 
is worth being), thereby taking our lives in our own hands? and, how can we get a sense 
of making our own choices, if orthonomy implies that the criteria for doing so cannot 
simply be of our own making?
Kantians tend to downplay the importance of the identity problem, by reducing autono-
my to orthonomy. a person (or more accurately: a will) is only autonomous (and not het-
eronomous) as long as the will governs itself rightly, i.e. according to principles that can 
be made into universal laws that bind every rational creature (allison 1990, pp. 85-106; 
hill 1991, pp. 43-51; o’neill 1989, pp. 51-65). neo-humeans like Michael smith hold 
that the value of  autonomy is entirely derived from the value we place on orthonomy, for 
– says smith- : “ …we value agents ruling themselves to just the extent that, in so doing, 
they thereby manifest their capacity to get things right” (smith 2004, p. 2).
Volitionalists like harry frankfurt seem to downplay the importance of the normativ-
ity problem in favour of an account of identity that explains where, in practical delib-
eration, the agent is to be found (frankfurt 1988, frankfurt 1999). frankfurt’s hierar-
chical account aims at elucidating why we are authorized to prefix an ‘i’ to the uptake 
of reasons and what is means that a person is leading a life of her own. 
although i strongly disagree with frankfurt’s account of the source of normativity, i 
believe that we can develop a viable view on the co-realisation of autonomy and or-
thonomy by using a concept that is central to his project: the concept of a concern 
which is closely linked to the concept op caring.
1. Concerns: Harry Frankfurt’s position
concerns point out the things that we care about. as such concerns are the source of 
mattering and of identity. The concept of a concern (what we care about) will help us 
to understand how we can make the right choices as well as our own choices in leading 
a life. 
caring about something differs from judging it to be valuable. There are many things 
that i may recognize as intrinsically valuable, without wanting to pursue them. There are 
many inherently valuable ways of spending your time and effort, but only some of these 
ways will be important to you in such a way that you can be said to care about what you 
do. concerns are valuables in which we are in a way ‘invested’. caring about something 
involves a complex set of mental dispositions and states of commitment by which a per-
son identifies with particular concerns.  such identification confers an identity on us. it 
delineates our shape as a person as it determines the self-conceptions under which we 
value ourselves. identification, understood as a specific kind of volitional commitment 
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also explains why our concerns have special authority for us. We are necessitated by what 
we care about because our commitment is a form of wholehearted acceptance. Whole-
heartedness, as frankfurt uses the term, “does not consist in a feeling of enthusiasm, or 
of certainty, concerning a commitment” (frankfurt 1988b, p.175). Wholeheartedness is a 
state of harmony or lack of inner conflict that we reach because we find no further reason 
to question or be ambivalent about the commitments we have.1
frankfurt understands the wholeheartedness of our commitments as a kind of what 
i would call acquiescence: a lack of ambivalence and, therefore, a lack of pressure for 
change of what we are committed to. 
now, it seems natural to think that this lack of pressure for change must in some sense 
be the result of reasonable conviction. one endorses the importance of the projects and 
ideals one is committed to, at least one sees no reason to question their importance, 
and therefore one lacks any feelings of ambivalence or doubt about one’s commitments. 
Therefore, it seems natural to think that one’s state of acquiescence ultimately rests 
upon one’s reflective awareness of the merits of what one cares about or at least upon 
one’s conviction that there is no reason to doubt those merits. This thought is nourished 
by the comparison frankfurt makes to arithmetic (frankfurt 1988b, pp. 167-168). hav-
ing made a calculation, you may perform another one in order to check the answer. if 
the outcome is identical, you may check again, but why would you do that? you will 
only do that, if there is reason to be more cautious, for instance because the calculation 
is very complex or because you know that you are very tired and apt to make a mistake. 
in the absence of such reasons, it seems perfectly reasonable to be unequivocally con-
fident that the result is correct or to decide that the negligible likelihood that a mistake 
has been made does not undermine the correctness of the answer. having no reserva-
tions is the hail mark of wholeheartedness. But, as this example makes clear, the lack 
of reservation rests upon your reflective insight into the soundness of the calculation, 
together with a lack of reasons to doubt that insight.
as with arithmetic, it seems that one’s state of acquiescence in case of what we care 
about is the result of having been ‘brought to rest’ by what is reasonable. of course, 
coming to care about something needs not be the result of reasoning and delibera-
tion. But wholehearted identification with one’s concern, involving a full lack of am-
bivalence, may require some level of scrutiny and critical reflection.2 Many interpreters 
1 This lack of conflict at the level of our commitments does not preclude tensions with first-order desires. a person 
may wholeheartedly have distanced herself from a desire, and yet this desire may still exert a powerful pull. it may 
even move her to do things she really doesn’t want to do. There is no tension in the person, however, as to whether 
the desire should move her or not. she has separated herself from it and she non-ambivalently embraces other 
desires. The latter desires are the ones she nourishes and wants to persist, which means that these desire are related 
to her identity-conferring concerns.
2 in general, this seems to be more so with goals and ideals, than with love for persons. Even so, we may come to 
scrutinise the worthiness of our loves, e.g. by questioning the worthiness of the sacrifices we make for our beloved 
ones: are they really worth it?
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of frankfurt, therefore, have thought that one’s wholehearted identification with one’s 
concerns must involve at least some moment of reflective endorsement.3 The whole-
heartedness that is at the basis of volitional necessities must rest, so it seems, upon a 
reflective awareness of the merits (or lack of non-merits) of our concerns. This means, 
however, that the effective authority of our concerns must finally derive from the fact 
that someone or something is worthy of our care. however, frankfurt explicitly denies 
this order of derivation.
…the fact that a person cares about something (…) need not derive from or 
depend on any evaluations and judgements that that person makes or accepts. 
The fact that something is important to someone is a circumstance that 
naturally has its causes, but it may neither originate in, nor be at all supported 
by, reasons. it may simply be a brute fact. (frankfurt 2002, p.161)
This brute fact, says frankfurt, needs no further reflective support. That a person whole-
heartedly accepts something “…is free of any suggestion concerning his basis for ac-
cepting it and, in particular, it does not imply that he thinks well of it”  (frankfurt 2002, 
p. 87).  of course, we may come to scrutinise our concerns. But, says frankfurt, the fact 
that “there is considerable room for reasons and argument in the clarification….and 
in the evaluation of their worthiness” (frankfurt 1999a, p. 115), does not imply that 
wholeheartedness necessarily rests upon our grasp of the reasons there are for deeming 
one’s object of concern as worthy of it. “Wholeheartedness”, says frankfurt, “consists 
just in a certain harmonious volitional structure, which can come about independently 
of a response to reasons” (frankfurt  2004, p. 126).
This means that the attitude of acceptance which results in the kind of commitment 
that makes some of our concerns authoritative to us need not involve any kind of reflec-
tive endorsement.
a person may be led to accept something about himself in resignation, as well 
as in approval or in recognition of its merit. The fact that he accepts it entails 
nothing, in other words, concerning what he thinks of it. (frankfurt 2002, p. 
160)
at some places, frankfurt, even suggests that acceptance out of exhaustion or depres-
sion may result in concerns that are authoritative for us. now, this does not only put 
doubts on the normative authority of such concerns, but of course also on the idea that 
such concerns have a say in where the agent stands. it is strange to think that acting 
out of a concern that one accepts in resignation or out of exhaustion is constitutive of 
the agent’s determination of the action. i doubt whether acting out of concern that one 
‘accepts’ in a state of depression amounts to full-blown agency, just as i doubt that such 
concerns have normative authority.
3  see herman 2002, Moran 2002, Watson 2002 and Wolf 2002.
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Why, then, does frankfurt allow such concerns to play a role in addressing the identity 
and the normativity problem?
This is so because we simply need goals and purposes in our lives. Without caring about 
things our lives would be void of any meaning. of course, it is better to care about 
things with which we have affinity, rather than to care about it in resignation. But, says 
frankfurt, this affinity need not be something that we endorse. it may be a kind of affin-
ity we just happen to have or even an affinity with horrible goals and abhorrent ideals, 
as long as caring for these goals and ideals provides for “continuity and coherence to 
our volitional lives”(frankfurt 1999c, p. 162). 
hitler’s affinity with the abhorrent ideology of nazism has brought him the opportu-
nity to develop the fullest range of his personal capacities and talents. it brought him 
fame and pride probably not attainable in other ways. nazism, says frankfurt, was for 
hitler a suitable ideal, despite its evil character.4 of course, frankfurt admits that “it is 
better for us to care about what is truly worth caring about than it is to care about things 
that are inconsequential or otherwise unworthy or that will bring us harm ”(frankfurt 
1999c, p.162). however, it is not better because we want to seek truth, but because 
things that are truly worth caring about are in general more suitable to be taken as im-
portant in our lives. They are suitable for establishing and sustaining “thematic” unity 
in our lives. The suitableness of our concerns is not derived from their value as such, 
however.
2. Necessitation
This makes clear what i meant when i said that frankfurt is downplaying the impor-
tance of the problem of normativity in favour of solving the identity problem. The fact 
that one’s concerns have become part of one’s own volitional structure and provide for 
thematic unity to one’s life does not entail that one is necessitated in a normative sense 
by what those concerns involve. The example of hitler is a case in point.
What is going wrong here is that frankfurt takes wholehearted acceptance not only as 
the source of the integration of a concern into what is constitutive of an identity (my 
leading this life)5, but also as the source of the normative authority of that concern. 
however, even concerns, strivings and worries a person identifies with cannot, without 
further ado, be authoritative for that person. The kind of volitional necessity frankfurt 
4 “it is possible, i am sorry to reveal, that immoral lives may be good to live. in my view, at least, the value to hitler 
of living the life he chose would have been damaged by the immorality of that life only if morality was something 
that hitler actually cared about, or if the immorality of his life somehow had a damaging effect on other matters 
that he cared about.” frankfurt 2002, 248.
5  i am not sure whether his account is fully successful. see for similar doubts Bratman 2001, pp. 314-315.
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is thinking of is not what we are looking for when we think of the normative necessita-
tion. 
necessitation means that you respond to a sense of ‘ought’. it results from what is nor-
mative for you. something is normative if it provides for a conclusive answer to the 
question ‘What should i do’?  a conclusive answer is an answer that is imperative be-
cause it stops further questioning. Most parents will find it impossible to ignore their 
own child crying in the night. They are volitionally necessitated by the love for their 
child. But even so, they may come to the conclusion that it is at some point better to try 
to ignore the crying child, for instance because it now has to learn that not every cry 
will be rewarded with the comfort of parental consolation. our self-reflective reason-
ing capacities make it possible for us to ask critical questions about what we cannot 
help caring about. We may come to the conclusion that we had better take steps to try 
to distance ourselves from some of our concerns. We may find good reason to try to 
escape the grip of some of our commitments. We can, at some point, ask whether what 
we care about really is worth it.
But, what can be imperative to us in such a way that the train of questions (‘is this really 
what i should do or should strive for?’) comes to a halt? Well, as Kant taught us, if our 
critical mind is the source of ongoing questions, then our mind must be the source of 
conclusive answers too. only reflective conviction can stop the train of questions. We 
can only be bound by what satisfies our critical mind. Therefore, we can only be bound 
by our own conviction about what is reasonably the right thing to do and to care about. 
and, as Kant also taught us, as soon as this conviction includes the conviction that the 
insight arrived at would be inescapable for all rational minds, our being captivated by 
conviction results in a kind of necessitation that is unconditional and final. 
The lack of freedom that we have in view of what is ‘reasonable’, however, is not iden-
tical to the lack of freedom that results from the need to establish and sustain “the-
matic” unity in our lives. The true life might be scattered and discontinuous in many 
respects.
Why does frankfurt deny that volitional necessity must be rational (instead of psycho-
logical)? Because he thinks that necessitation by reasonable conviction cannot escape 
a fatal circularity:
There can be no well-ordered inquiry into the question of how one has reason 
to live, because the prior question of how to identify and to evaluate the reasons 
that are pertinent in deciding how one should live cannot be settled until is has 
first been settled how one should live. The question of what one should care 
about must already be answered, in other words, before a rationally conducted 
inquiry aimed as answering it can even get under way. it is true, of course, that 
once a person has identified some things as important to him, he may readily 
be able on that basis to identify others. The fact that he cares about certain 
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things will very likely make it possible for him to recognize that it would be 
reasonable for him to care about various related things as well. What is not 
possible is for a person who does not already care at least about something to 
discover reasons for caring about anything. nobody can pull himself up by 
his own bootstraps. This means that the most basic and essential question for 
a person concerning the conduct of his life cannot be the normative question 
of how he should live. This question can sensibly be asked only on the basis 
of a prior answer to the factual question of what he actually does care about. 
if he cares about nothing, he cannot even begin to inquire methodically into 
how he should live; for his caring about nothing entails that there is nothing 
that can count for him as a reason in favour of living in one way rather than 
another.(…) as a matter of fact, however, nearly everyone does care about 
something. nearly everyone cares about staying alive, for instance, and about 
avoiding severe injury, disease, hunger, and various kinds of psychic distress 
and disorder. They care about their children, about their livelihoods, and about 
how others think of them. needles to say, they generally also care about many 
other things as well. for nearly everyone, there are a number of considerations 
that count as reasons for preferring one way of living over another. (frankfurt 
2004, pp. 27-28)
3. The structure of rational reflection
frankfurt is right that there might be a circularity, but only because he starts from too 
simple an idea of what is involved in a rational inquiry into how we should live. rea-
sonable conviction does not involve having insight into the rational groundings of all 
our concerns ad infinitum. We have to take some things for granted. That we have to 
start somewhere and take certain considerations or views as given (for the time being) 
does not mean that a well-ordered rational inquiry is impossible.
let me first express a general observation about this and then (in the next section) 
analyse the role of concerns in practical thought by taking the example frankfurt gives 
about our concern to stay alive as a starting point.
lewis carroll showed that for any valid argument, there must be a background rule of 
inference that is endorsed without having this background rule itself being made ex-
plicit in the argument as a premise (carroll 1895). i hold, but will not argue for it, that 
such background rules of inference are best understood as expressing inferential dispo-
sitions. The idea is that in reasoning we have to make a distinction between the explicit 
reasons that figure on the foreground as the premises in the argument and dispositions 
on the background that we could make explicit if pressed, but that we do not need to 
make explicit in order to be justified to draw the conclusion. inferential dispositions in 
the background, like those expressed by rules of inference, shape our reasoning without 
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fulfilling a supportive role in the inference. This is why the explicit argument in the 
foreground is not enthymematic: it is not an argument that is incomplete because one 
of the premises is not explicitly stated. The argument is complete and the conclusion is 
justified, in spite of the fact that the argument is being given shape by dispositions in 
the background that we do not need to justify.
This does not mean that the inferential dispositions in the background are never tak-
en into explicit consideration. someone may opt for a deviant system of logic, which 
makes it necessary for me to make the inference rules that i take for granted explicit. 
however, this is an unusual event. usually, we may endorse background dispositions, 
necessary to make rational reflection possible, without having these dispositions play a 
role on the foreground of deliberation.
an important corollary of this is that our reliance on background dispositions is not 
due to limitations of reasoning power. Even unlimited minds, perfectly rational and 
fully informed, will have to rely on inferential dispositions that have no explicit role to 
play on the foreground of reasoning.
4. Concerns shape reasoning without functioning as premises on the 
foreground of deliberation.
My contention is that concerns function in the above-sketched way as background dis-
positions in practical reasoning. in his paper “The concern to survive”, David Wiggins 
says that our desire to survive into the future is not “a thing that we can treat as a brute 
datum” (Wiggins 1987, p. 305), although there is “ something instinctive here and irre-
ducible”( Wiggins 1987, p. 307). These are, says Wiggings, “things that we need reasons 
to opt out of rather than things that we have to look for deep reasons to opt into. That 
is how it is with human rationality” (Wiggins 1987, p. 307).
Many of our concerns function like this. We may have reasons to opt out of these con-
cerns, but in the absence of such reasons, it is reasonable for us to harbour them, and 
let them shape our practical deliberation. They are needed in the background, but they 
need not to be made explicit to complete the reasoning that is made possible by them. 
They inform our reasoning without functioning at the foreground of deliberation as 
premises to our conclusions. 
let me illustrate with some examples. say that upon hearing the news that your mother 
has fallen seriously ill, you decide to cut short your holiday trip and return home im-
mediately to visit her in the hospital. you think you must do so because your mother 
really needs your presence now. This is enough reason to pack and take the next plane 
home. in order to justify your decision you need not add premises like: ‘My mother 
is very important to me, therefore i want to be there now that she needs me’ or ‘as 
a son i have a duty to support my parents, especially when they really need it’. These 
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are not the premises upon which your practical conclusion is conditional. you do not 
decide to take the plane, because you want to relieve your concern with being a good 
son or because you are disposed to help a person who is important to you. you pack 
immediately, because your mother needs your presence now. similarly, a mother does 
not decide to take an extra job to pay for the school fees of her child because of the 
prospect of relieving her concern with being a good mother if she does so, but because 
of the prospect that this will serve the future opportunities of her child. Motherhood 
and childhood are practical identities that involve specific concerns and expectations 
that have no discursive role to play on the foreground of deliberation. Their role is in 
the background: they explain why the illness of these women or the future of this child 
matters to you and why you are bound to cut short your holiday trip or to work hard 
for your child’s future, but they do not play a role in the justification of your choices. 
your decision is not reached via de recognition that being a mother or a son brings 
with it having certain things matter to you. Being a son or being a mother simply has it 
that certain things matter to you. agents are disposed to act upon what they care about 
without bringing these concerns explicitly into the foreground of deliberation.
it is even strange to have such background concerns function as premises in the fore-
ground of deliberation. They seem to lose part of their character as concerns –disposi-
tions to take things as deeply mattering to us-- the moment they (or constraints implied 
by them) are brought forward as premises in the argument. The mother who explicitly 
calls upon her mother role in justifying the support she gives to her child seems to have 
brought forward ‘one premise to many’. is it not obvious to her that she has to do this as 
a mother? or think of the teacher who justifies his call for silence by saying “you have 
to listen to me, i am the teacher”. By appealing to something that should be self-evident 
the teacher seems to have lost half of his authority already.  
concerns cannot function on the foreground of deliberation. Why is this?  
(a) it is because concerns themselves are not reasons, and, therefore, cannot function as 
premises. reasons are facts. concerns are mental states or complexes of mental states.
(b) This is shown in the fact that the invocation of concerns by the agent herself as jus-
tification of her action involves taking up a too third personal point of view, rather than 
speaking from a first personal angle. and this explains the rather odd feeling we have 
when the mother calls upon her motherhood to justify her care for her child.
5. Reasons, concerns and character
reasons are not mental states. reasons are normative facts: facts that make valid claims 
on agents. reasons make such claims by putting certain actions or attitudes or feelings 
in a favourable light. reasons as normative facts are motivating in virtue of their nor-
mativity (it is in virtue of their normativity that people are moved to act in accordance 
with them).
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reasons are not mental states, although we sometimes seem to refer to mental states 
when we mention the reason for doing something. Why are you not coming to the fac-
ulty party tonight? Because i want to help my foster son with his homework. instead of 
taking that to mean that my desire is the reason to help my foster son, we should take 
it as expressing my response to the reason for staying home: my foster son needs my 
help. i could as well say “Because i need to help my foster son” without meaning that 
my need instead of his is the reason for staying home and helping him. saying “Because 
i want to help my foster son with his homework now he needs it” is double: i point out 
the reason for staying home (my foster son needs my help) and i signal my recognition 
of this reason as normative. We have to look through the mental state of responding to 
a reason in order to find the reason itself - which is a fact. similarly, why in the recent 
Dutch referendum did i vote in favour of the new European constitution? Because i 
believe this is the only way to give Europe enough power to countervail the us. This is 
not pointing out my belief as a reason. We have to look through the belief to find the 
reason, which is a fact.
i think that the tendency to identify reasons with the mental states of recognising and 
responding to reasons is due to the tendency to mix up a first personal and a third 
personal way of answering the why question. Why did i vote in favour of the new Euro-
pean constitution? Because i believe that this is the only way to make Europe powerful 
enough to countervail the us. This explains my vote, in a third-personal way, by point-
ing out the fact that i take a certain reason as conclusive. 
in explaining someone’s behaviour we may refer to his mental states, e.g. his state of 
responding to a reason (he believes that…,  he felt that…). But that does not mean 
that these mental states are part of the reason for the agent or that they play any role in 
the agent’s own deliberation. from a first-personal point of view we look through our 
mental states to the facts that constitute normative reasons.
can we do without mental states, then? no, of course not, because an agent can only 
act for a reason if she is aware of that reason. acting upon reasons, and not just in 
accordance with them, requires that the agent responds to a reason-constituting fact 
by acknowledging the to-be-doneness that is involved in that fact, and here concerns 
come in. for the recognition of to-be-doneness, the awareness of normativity, is a sign 
of the agent taking a certain view on things: a view in which certain facts matter and 
others do not, certain facts are important in relation to what she feels, chooses, does 
or leaves undone. This view is provided by our concerns that consist in sets of disposi-
tions to take certain facts as having certain justifying significance or weight. concerns 
are not, as frankfurt has it, mental states of wholehearted identification and subjective 
necessity. concerns are windows on the world of normative facts: they give us a view 
on what is normatively important. 
This suggests a second reason why concerns cannot function as premises on the fore-
ground of deliberation. i said that the invocation of concerns by the agent herself to 
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justify her action involves taking up a too third-personal point of view, rather than 
speaking from a first-personal angle, and this explains the weirdness of a son appealing 
to his filial love as a reason to fly to his mother, now she needs him.
We can see this, not only because of what i just said about the tendency to identify 
mental states like concerns and reasons being due to the tendency to mix up the third-
personal and the first-personal point of view. We can see this also, if we think of it that 
patterns of concern are often typical of a person’s character, and as such of a person’s 
personality or identity.
for sure, this is why practical reasoning shaped by background concerns reveals where 
the agent stands. in our search to govern ourselves rightly, we are responsive to reasons. 
But as this responsiveness itself is shaped by our background concerns, our orthono-
mous choices will add up to leading a life that is recognisable as a life of our own. 
This does not mean that our responsiveness to reasons can be taken to result in orthono-
mous choices only if we acknowledge that our conclusions are premised upon the con-
cerns that provide for windows on the world of normative facts. concerns and the char-
acter that they add up to cannot unprobematically be invoked by an agent to justify her 
own action; at least this is how we experience it. if you ask me, why i take the next plane 
to visit my mother now that she needs me and i say “Because i have never been able to 
set myself free from my mother’s influence” this sounds more as an excuse (i refer to a 
psychic trait i wish i didn’t have) than as revealing to you the reason why i take the next 
plane. someone else can say of me “he has never been able to set himself free from his 
mother’s influence” or “he is still such a mother’s child”, but such a reference to a personal 
trait does not rationalise my action. Therefore, if i refer to my love for my mother (the 
background concern that makes the fact that she is in need normatively salient), i seem 
to be taking in a similar way a too third- personal stance towards myself. This is too third-
personal at least to be able to reveal the reason why i take the next plane. asking the agent 
why she does something naturally is asking the agent to give her interlocutor a window 
into the reasons that justify her action. answering “i cannot but take the next flight to see 
her because she needs me” is of a different character then answering “i cannot but take the 
next flight, because i am still such a mother’s child” or “i cannot but take the next flight, 
because i deeply love my mother”. The first answer is normative: it reveals why i am ratio-
nally necessitated to do what i do. The second two answers are psychological: they reveal 
why i am psychologically bound to do what i do. 
6. Concerns have epistemic, not just pragmatic authority
concerns are dispositions that provide for windows on the world of normative facts.
concerns make facts salient and important by default. That they do so needs no further 
justification. This is the default situation. sometimes we are challenged to justify our 
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viewing things in a certain way which makes us take up particular facts as normative. 
someone may challenge my sense of filial obligation or criticise the maternal dedica-
tion that makes it a matter of course for women to take a second job to pay for the 
school fees of her child. sometimes we need to scrutinise our concerns. But this is not 
the default situation. normally, our concerns shape and steer our practical delibera-
tion without being themselves in need of rational support. as long as their authority as 
windows on the world of normative facts is unchallenged, they may shape what counts 
for us as a reason.
Why is this? i contend that the authority of concerns is epistemic. concerns, as i under-
stand them, have epistemic authority. We trust the epistemic soundness of the way con-
cerns give us a view on the world of normative facts (until we have reason to challenge 
this way of viewing things). The authority of the presentation of what is normatively sa-
lient does not depend on the unifying and organisational function of that way of view-
ing things; hence, it is not pragmatic. We trust the way our concerns shape what counts 
for us as a reason and what weight that reason has, just as we trust our disposition to 
apply modus ponens if we derive q from p & (p→q). The instrumental use of concerns 
in practical thinking does not add to the reasons we have for taking these concerns as 
reliable outlooks on the world of normative facts. These reasons are given by what we 
see and not by the fact that ‘seeing structure’ is to be preferred to ‘seeing chaos’ and be-
ing deeply confused about what the right choices are. authentic life may be scattered, 
confused and discontinuous in many respects. But even such a life will always be better 
than the good-to-live life of adolf hitler.
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